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Two weeks after a unanimous Supreme Court ordered Richard
Nixon to honor a trial subpoena issued by the Special Prosecutor in
the Vatergate cover-up case,' President Nixon became the first Presi-
dent in American history to resign from office. The disclosure of the
"smoking gun" tape, which demonstrated the President's active com-
plicity in the cover-up conspiracy from virtually the first moment,
had eroded all but the most fanatical Nixon support in Congress.
The President had been left facing the almost certain prospect of
impeachment by the House 2 on the three articles of impeachment
approved by the Judiciary Committee.3 Although the eventual out-
come of a possible trial in the Senate was somewhat less certain,
there was no doubt that the trial would be a lengthy, tortured affair
further immobilizing the conduct of the national government. The
President's resignation, therefore, was greeted by an audible sigh of
relief around the country.4 With a combination of smugness and
elation, politicians, journalists, and lawyers promptly proclaimed:
"Our system works."'
In contrast, Professor Philip B. Kurland's new book, Watergate
and the Constitution, argues that the Watergate episode demonstrates
that our governmental system, in its present form, does not work.
7
- Member, New York and District of Columbia Bars; formerly Counsel to the Special
Prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force.
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2. See 3 WATERGATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE 230-31 (1974) (E. Knappman & E. Drossman
eds.) [hereinafter cited as WATERGATE 3].
3. See generally HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [herein-
after cited as IMIPF-CHMIENT REPORT].
4. See WATERcATE 3, supra note 2, at 226.
5. See, e.g., IMPEFACHMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 319-20 (statement of Rep. Rangel);
L. JAWoRSI4i, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER 279 (1976).
6. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CoNsrsTUnoN (1978) [hereinafter cited by page
number only].
7. Kurland notes initially that "It]he notion that because we have come through one
critical period we have been restored to health is more wish than reality. Perhaps we
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Kurland identifies the root problem of Watergate as the differences
between our current governmental system and that envisioned in
the Constitution." He contends that there were "two distortions of
constitutional government revealed by 'Watergate":9 a shift in the
balance of power from Congress to the executive branch, and the
rise within the executive branch of an inordinately powerful White
House staff.10 He attributes the Watergate abuses to these institutional
weaknesses," and concludes that, after Watergate, no "reforms" have
dealt with them.'
2
In seeking the major lesson of Watergate, Kurland comes to the
right conclusion for the wrong reasons. Watergate did indeed dem-
onstrate fundamental defects in our governmental system, but they
are not the defects that Kurland suggests. Kurland confronts the
inevitable when he assails the rise of a powerful executive branch,
and misses the real lesson of Watergate when he fails to discuss the
inadequacy of the means available for controlling abuses of power
-specifically the lack of a viable impeachment mechanism. These
defects in Kurland's analysis in turn stem from a pervasive fallacy
in his work: the assumption that the causes of Watergate were ex-
clusively institutional. Finally, because he misperceives the causes of
Watergate, Kurland underestimates the value of some of the reforms
that have emerged, although his sense that the largest problems re-
main unremedied is correct.
I. The Lesson of Watergate: Our System
Does Not Work
Although Kurland accurately perceives that Watergate demonstrates
fundamental failures in our governmental system, his development
of that theme is ultimately inadequate. Kurland concentrates his
have removed a cancerous growth that could have killed us. We have not rid the system
of the disease." P. 4. Kurland goes on to state that "[t]he constitutional crisis of Water-
gate . . . was the result of the failure to adhere to the limitations on authority that are
explicit and implicit in the Constitution." P. 5. He places considerable blame on the
courts, discussing at some length the process of "constitutional amendment" by the
judiciary, see pp. 8-16, and the role of the courts in making "[t]he separation of powers
as a doctrine restraining the exercise of power by the executive branch . . . all but dis-
appea[r]." P. 176.
8. Pp. 7-10, 157-63, 214-15; see p. 166 ("We are governed today by a constitution far
different from that which Washington bequeathed to us. And the most basic changes
have been brought about by means other than constitutional amendment.
9. P. 198.
10. Id. Kurland also spends considerable time assailing the judiciary and its role in
contributing to the shift in power to the executive branch. See, e.g., pp. 6-16, 53-74.
11. See, e.g., pp. 4, 170-72, 181.
12. Pp. 183, 198-99.
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attention on the causes of Watergate and the lack of significant
post-Watergate reforms, arguing in effect that another "Watergate"
could occur just as easily today as the first one did.' 3 Kurland fails,
however, to address the particular resolution of the Watergate crisis,
which, he seems to agree, was a successful one.14 Without establishing
the fortuitous nature of the unraveling of the conspiracy and the
displacement of the guilty from government, Kurland cannot estab-
lish that the next Watergate, even if just as likely to come, will not
be just as successfully concluded. Those who proclaim that Watergate
proves that our system works really claim nothing more.
Moreover, Kurland fails to present a convincing analysis of the
ineffectiveness of our governmental system because he confuses his
readers, and perhaps also himself, by using the single term "Water-
gate" to refer to various aspects of a complex of issues. In making
his observations on "Watergate," Kurland fails to distinguish the
original conspiracy within the executive branch from the initial re-
sponses of each of the three branches to the various executive trans-
gressions, and the long-term reforms that have, or have not, resulted.15
Clearly, different structural defects in our system may be reflected by
each of these.' 6 Although Kurland should, of course, be granted some
license to use the catchword "Watergate" when his meaning is clear
from context, his careless use of that slippery term blurs some of his
arguments. Kurland's failure to treat the analytically distinct aspects
of the complex Watergate episode in a systematic manner seriously
flaws this book.17
Kurland's case is easy to make. Clearly, the Watergate episode re-
vealed a multitude of defects in our governmental system. The very
fact that the original conspiracy evolved and was implemented re-
flects serious institutional weaknesses. Those who claim that Water-
13. See, e.g., pp. 4-5, 224.
14. See pp. 4, 181-82.
15. See, e.g., pp. 2-6, 172, 201-02.
16. The fact that the President and his aides responded to the Watergate break-in by
initiating a massive cover-up may well indicate a more serious governmental breakdown
than that which led to the burglary itself. Similarly, the fact that Congress's immediate
response to the break-in was so limited may reflect a different inadequacy from that
demonstrated by the difficulties experienced in conducting the impeachment hearings
themselves, once those hearings were finally initiated. Finally, the fact that no truly
radical reform has come about-for example, reform of the impeachment mechanism
itself-may reflect yet another shortcoming in our system.
17. At the outset of the book, Kurland indicates his intent not to deal with "one of
the issues posed by Watergate"--the problem of "how to bring down the powerful leader
who abused his authority"--and to address instead the issue "[h]ow does one prevent the
accession to such power by the just and the 'njust alike?" P. 3. In thus limiting the
scope of his analysis, Kurland seriously limits its usefulness, for he chooses to ignore some
of the most serious problems that Watergate revealed.
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gate proves our system works readily admit this, but point to the
successful exposure of the conspiracy and purge of the conspirators
as evidence of compensating checks that are built into the system.' 8
The responses of the three branches to the original conspiracy, how-
ever, were anything but reassuring. Most alarming, perhaps, were the
failures of Congress. Congress was slow to initiate investigations in
the first place and slow to conduct them once they were initiated.'9
Moreover, Congress seemed almost incapable of taking the necessary
remedial steps once the guilt of the President became evident.
The fact that the discovery of the Watergate conspiracies and the
displacement of the guilty from government was largely fortuitous
is equally evident. In a real sense, the Watergate conspiracy unraveled,
not because of the Constitution, but in spite of it. Kurland identifies
some of these ironies, but misses others. It was the tenacity of a single
federal judge, John J. Sirica, that caused the first conspirator to
crack. Sensing a larger plot, Judge Sirica used one of the few weapons
available to federal judges, the sentencing power, to exert decisive
pressure on the conspirators. Few other district judges would have
pushed the point as vigorously as Judge Sirica did, and it was his
persistent commitment, rather than any formal constitutional pro-
cedures, that first broke through the conspiracy.
20
18. See, e.g., H. COMMAGER, THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA: PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
NATIONAL CHARACTER 153-58 (1976).
19. The first significant congressional action in response to Watergate came on October
3, 1972, when the House Banking and Currency Committee rejected a proposal by Chair-
man Wright Patman to probe possible violations of banking laws in connection with the
break-in and possible campaign finance irregularities by the Republican Party. See 1
WATERGATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE 14 (E. Knappman ed. 1973). With the single execption
of Senator Edward Kennedy's short-lived Judiciary Subcommittee study, see id. at 20, no
congressional hearings on Watergate were conducted until mid-May 1973, almost a full
year after the Watergate break-in, when those of the Senate Select Committee began. See
id. at 51 (hearings began May 17, 1973); cf. H. REP. No. 453, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973)
(Special House Subcommittee on Intelligence commenced hearings limited to possible CIA
involvement in Watergate and Ellsberg matters six days earlier on May 11, 1973). The
Senate Committee took well over a year to conclude its inquiry: it did not issue its final
report until July 13, 1974. See WVATERGATE 3, supra note 2, at 185.
20. Whether Judge Sirica exceeded his constitutional power in using his judicial office
to compel cooperation in a criminal investigation is an intriguing question. One of the
dramatic ironies of Watergate was the necessity of relying on constitutionally problematic
means in order to break through the conspiracies and bring the guilty to justice. Perhaps
even more troubling than Sirica's action was the fact that the various investigators relied
so heavily on the so-called "use immunity" statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976). See,
e.g., Application of the United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C. 1973) (seeking immunity for testimony of Jeb
Magruder and John Dean). Although the constitutionality of the use immunity statute has
been upheld, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), it is nonetheless disquieting
to realize that encroachment on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was essential to the unfolding of the cover-up conspiracy.
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Several commentators have pointed to the string of fortuitous events
that led to the exposure of the Watergate conspiracies: 21 the peculiar
presidential decision to install an extensive recording system, the un-
characteristic failure to deactivate it during the conspiratorial dis-
cussions, and the chance discovery of the existence of the tapes through
the speculative questioning of a minor White House aide by a junior
congressional staffer. Of course, one can only guess as to the exact
course the Watergate investigation would have taken had no tapes
existed or more been destroyed, but the fundamental importance
of that evidence in leading to the Nixon resignation can scarcely be
disputed.
Similarly, President Nixon's departure from office was not, ulti-
mately, the result of the constitutional process of impeachment and
conviction, 22 or even of the Supreme Court's decision that his con-
stitutionally based claim of "executive privilege" had to yield to the
imperatives of a fair trial in the Watergate cover-up case. 23 Rather,
the decision to release the "smoking gun" tape of June 23, 1972 at
the critical phase of the impeachment process was one that was forced
on President Nixon by the resolve of his top aides. 24 Under the pro-
cedures specified by the Supreme Court in the Nixon Tapes Case,25
it would have been possible for the President and his lawyers to have
delayed the actual disclosure of any of the subpoenaed tapes for
months or perhaps years. During that time, in the absence of the
most damning evidence, President Nixon's defense against impeach-
ment by the House, and certainly his defense against conviction and
removal after a Senate trial, would have stood a substantial chance
of success.
20
Moreover, even the massive public and congressional reaction to
the release of the "smoking gun" tape was not, by itself, enough to
lead to the resignation of President Nixon. It took the combined
21. See, e.g., IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 296 (statement of Rep. Conyers)
("It has frequently been argued . . . that [the House impeachment] inquiry and the
President's subsequent resignation demonstrate that 'the system works.' But such satisfac-
tion or complacency is misguided .... If the system has worked, it has worked by accident
and good fortune."); C. MEE, A VIsrr To HALDEMAN AND OTHER STATES OF MIND 18-19
(1977); B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS (1976).
22. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & § 3, cls. 6-7, art. II, § 4.
23. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). The major circuit court opinion
in the Watergate cover-up case is United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977).
24. See J. DOYLE, NOT ABOVE THE LAw 343-44 (1977); B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN,
supra note 21, at 323-25.
25. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974) (providing for in camera in-
spection and editing of subpoenaed material by district court).
26. See IMPEACHMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 359-60 (minority report).
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efforts of virtually all of Nixon's top aides to convince him to resign,
and even then Nixon came perilously close to refusing their urgings
27
and insisting on "stick[ing] it out.
2 8
Although Kurland believes that our current governmental system
does not work, he is convinced that our constitutional system, at least
as originally envisioned by the framers, would work, if only given a
chance.29 Kurland views the major cause of Watergate as the shift
in the balance of power from Congress to the executive branch, a
shift he blames in part on the long years of informal constitutional
amendment by judicial interpretation,3" and in part on congressional
abdication and presidential domination or usurpation.31
Kurland is undoubtedly right in suggesting that unchecked accre-
tion of power in the executive branch led to the original abuses of
Watergate. He is also correct to point to the disinclination of Con-
gress to assert itself as leading to the original congressional failure
to initiate investigations and to the subsequent inability to pursue
them expeditiously. And he is right in asserting that court decisions
denying Congress the information it needed for its investigations con-
tributed to Congress's inordinate difficulty in conducting its investiga-
tions. However, in stopping here, Kurland stops short, for these points
address only the difficulties of unraveling the two conspiracies, the
original conspiracy and the cover-up. Kurland completely overlooks
the principal constitutional deficiency illustrated by Watergate: the
inability of Congress to move effectively to remedy the crisis once the
conspiracies had become evident. It is particularly ironic that Kurland,
with his emphasis on the system of checks and balances and their
demonstrable failure in the Watergate affair, omits any discussion of
the inadequacy of the impeachment mechanism. This is even more star-
tling in light of Kurland's own admission that impeachment was
originally intended as the "primary" congressional check on the
executive.32
Watergate in fact demonstrated that the very constitutional process
provided for dealing with a miscreant President may be the best de-
fense he has. The process of impeaching Nixon was initiated in Oc-
tober 1973, after the so-called "Saturday Night Massacre," and the
27. See B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, sufkra note 21, at 322-60, 376-87.
28. Id. at 376.
29. See p. 5 (Watergate resulted from failure to adhere to constitutional limitations on
authority).
30. Pp. 6-15, 163; see p. 8 ("[T]he process of amending the Constitution has not been
confined to the formal amendment processes ... "
31. See p. 172.
32. P. 164.
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organized investigation began the following February. By the time
the President resigned in August 1974, the accumulation of evidence
itself had consumed six months, and the process was still at the
Committee stage. Floor debates in the House and a Senate trial, once
begun, would have consumed many months, thus carrying President
Nixon toward the close of his term in any event.
During that process, of course, both the Congress and the President
would have been virtually incapable of dealing with any other na-
tional problem. The almost total paralysis of the national government
in the period immediately preceding Nixon's resignation has been
vividly described in The Final Days.33 Watergate had become almost
a full-time obsession with the President and his top aides, and the
conduct of domestic government and foreign relations was at a vir-
tual standstill.3 4 The President's position had been seriously com-
promised, not just with respect to congressional leaders, but with
respect to foreign heads of state as well.3 5 The prospect of such a
situation continuing had Nixon decided to "stick it out" is not a
comfortable one.
A system like the impeachment mechanism may have been adequate
in 1787, when America was a simple agrarian society, when it took
several weeks to span the Atlantic, and when a national government
could literally assemble in the parlor of a rooming house. Two cen-
turies later, however, the complexity of international and domestic
affairs no longer permitted the luxury of impeachment. Apparently
concluding, among other things,36 that it was not in the "national
interest" to allow the President and the Congress to pursue the con-
33. B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, supra note 21.
34. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1974, at 26. Special Prosecutor Jaworski concluded,
based on his conversations with General Haig and his review of the White House tapes,
that President Nixon was so "enmeshed in Watergate . . . that he apparently had few
hours left for regular business." L. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 136-87; see id. at 271-72.
35. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 34, at 26. Moreover, after the release of the "smoking
gun" tape on August 5, 1974, the President's incapacity to govern became even more
severe. As the President himself stated in his resignation speech on August 8, 1974:
[B]ecause of the Watergate matter I might not have the support of the Congress that
I would consider necessary to back the very difficult decisions and carry out the duties
of this office in the way the interests of the nation will require.
... America needs a full-time President and a full-time Congress ....
... To continue to fight through the months ahead for my personal vindication
would almost totally absorb the time and attention of both the president and the
Congress ....
President's Address of August 8, 1974, 1974 PUB. PAPERS 626.
36. Nixon's aides were also motivated during this period by partisan concerns. See, e.g.,
B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, suPra note 21, at 827 (aides favored release of June 23 tape
because "President could not sabotage his supporters with any more nasty surprises" and
because "issue was no longer the fate of one President, but of the Republican Party").
665
The Yale Law Journal
stitutional process of impeachment, President Nixon's closest aides
made the judgment that the President could no longer demand that
his adversaries follow the procedure established by the Constitution.
It was they who insisted that the fatal evidence be disclosed im-
mediately, thus further damaging the President's credibility-even
with his congressional defenders-and making prompt resignation a
real possibility. As one commentator has noted, however, "Republics
are not saved when their .. .salvation depends on the accidents of
a tape recording machine and the wits of a four-star general.","' 7 If
we are ever to take any comfort in our system, some reform of the
impeachment mechanism is essential.
II. The Causes of Watergate: Personal or Institutional?
Although the complementary processes of congressional abdication
and presidential domination played a role in Watergate, Kurland dras-
tically exaggerates their importance. These shifts in the relationships
between the political branches, earlier described in Arthur Schlesin-
ger's The Imperial Presidency,38 certainly helped to make Watergate
possible. For one thing, these developments undoubtedly fueled the
inherently dangerous notion that the President's unique selection by
national referendum makes him the embodiment of the national will.
Under that notion, any program, policy, or initiative envisioned by
the President is inherently in the "national interest," and any or-
ganized opposition is automatically an antidemocratic threat to "na-
tional security." Moreover, the largely unchecked accretion of power
in the White House made possible a second development: the growth
of a large and powerful White House staff, a cadre of faceless "as-
sistant Presidents" lacking any personal political base and immune
to regular congressional oversight. Kurland correctly identifies the
rise of this "fourth branch" of government as a major source of po-
tential abuse, apart from, and in addition to, the general shift of
power from Congress to the executive branch. Kurland's commentary
goes astray, however, in dismissing the personal element in Water-
gate.39 After devoting some attention to prior instances of presiden-
tial overreaching by Nixon's predecessors, 40 Kurland then minimizes
Nixon's full culpability:
37. C. MEE, sukra note 21, at 18-19.
38. A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
39. See, e.g., p. 153 ("The primary evil revealed by the events of Watergate was the
presidency: not the man but the office.")
40. Pp. 210-19.
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Nixon revealed not a capacity for innovation but only a capacity
for imitation. What he did ... was to utilize devices created by
predecessors, who used them sparingly, while he used them per-
sistently; who used them in isolation, while he used them in
combination; who used them unsuccessfully, while he used them
successfully, until they failed him in the end.
41
It is fundamentally wrong, however, to assert that Watergate was
simply the logical extension of previously institutionalized precedents.
Existing institutions and attitudes may have provided a medium for
Watergate, but the personal character of the participants was the
essential catalyst. In the Watergate episode, the assumption that a
President and his White House cadre are anointed with a popular
mission was reinforced by the absence of any detectable sense of
public morality on the part of the President and his key staff aides.42
As a result, once the pointless and reckless escapade at the Democratic
National Committee's Watergate headquarters misfired in June 1972,
a relentless logic overwhelmed the White House: the President's po-
litical survival was of supreme importance to the Nation, and any
measures to preserve his status and stature became legitimate.
In focusing exclusively on the institutional causes of Watergate,
Kurland forces the facts to make Watergate fit his conception of
the flaws in our constitutional system. Kurland's theme is hardly
surprising to anyone who is familiar with his constitutional phi-
losophy. 43 A former law clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter, Kurland
is now perhaps the leading academic exponent of the philosophy that
the constitutional plan of the framers demands restraint by the ju-
diciary, restriction of the executive, and deference to the legislature.
Kurland attributes many social and political problems-including, in
this latest volume, Watergate-to the steady erosion of this plan. Kur-
land's thesis is that to secure liberty and democracy it is necessary
both to divide powers between the national government and the
states and to separate and mix powers among three branches of
the national government. In Kurland's view:
The constitutional crisis of Watergate was the result of a long
buildup of concentrated governmental power. It was the result of
the failure to adhere to the limitations on authority that are
explicit and implicit in the Constitution. It was the result of long
41. P. 219 (citation omitted).
42. This expedient amorality is graphically depicted by John Dean, President Nixon's
White House counsel, in Blind Ambition. See J. DEAN, BLIND AMBITION (1976).
43. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970).
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denial of institutional values in favor of temporary political ex-
pediency. The tragedy of Watergate lies not in the pitiful char-
acter of the man exiled from the White House; it lies rather in
the continued failure of the nation to take steps first to cabin
and then to dissipate that accumulated power, the failure to re-
vive our constitutional notions of limitations on authority. The
flow to the government of power over the lives of Americans has
been at flood tide for generations. There is still no sign of
ebbing.
44
Kurland evidently subscribes to Lord Acton's oft-repeated claim
that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. He
quotes lines from Shelley that, he suggests, "anticipated" the con-
stitutional crisis of Watergate: 45 " 'Power, like a desolating pestilence,
Pollutes whate'er it touches.' ",46 In attempting to support this gloomy
appraisal of the American constitutional system, Kurland unfortu-
nately exhibits the license that is appropriate for an essayist or satirist,
but not for a constitutional scholar or political historian. That two
centuries of independence have witnessed a steady secular growth of
national power can scarcely be denied. Nor is it possible to deny that
great power may be used to threaten liberty. But it need not always be.
It is of course prudent to be vigilant in monitoring the officials
to whom governmental power is entrusted, and to cabin those powers
when necessary. Yet Kurland's analysis is deficient because it yearns for
simpler days of weaker, diffused government, but does not address the
feasibility of such retrenchment. While highlighting the risks of con-
centrated government, he nowhere suggests how "weaker" govern-
ment can effectively or responsibly cope with the complex demands
of an industrial, interdependent world. We may share Kurland's nos-
talgia, and recognize the germ of wisdom in his message, but we
are entitled to something more.
Kurland's emphasis on redesigning or, as he would put it, re-
viving, our system of governance is unfortunately one-dimensional.
Politicians, as was recently illustrated by Jimmy Carter's successful
campaign for the Presidency, tend to stress human virtue and morality
as the ultimate ingredient in good government. Academics tend to
go to the opposite extreme and stress institutions or metaphysical
systems. What Watergate illustrates, however, is that neither of these
44. P. 5.
45. Id.
46. Id. (quoting P. SHELLEY, Queen Mab, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF PERCY
BYSSHE SHELLEY 252 (N. Rogers ed. 1972)).
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two views is entirely accurate. Institutional systems can be important
in deterring or correcting abuses of power. Yet the concentration of
considerable power is inherent in modem government, and, re-
grettably, there is a natural tendency for that power to be abused.
In part, the ability to restrain these tendencies depends on the ready
availability of a successful mechanism to control the power. Of equal
importance, however, is the careful choice of leaders with sound
judgment and constitutional sensitivity. What makes Watergate unique
in our history is that the American people twice elected-the second
time, by an unprecedented margin 4-- a man firmly believed by mil-
lions of voters to be basically dishonest.48 In a sense, therefore, the
greatest constitutional failure in Watergate was the failure of the
electoral process to entrust the intense powers decried by Kurland
to a more reliable President.
III. Post-Watergate Reforms
Turning to post-Watergate reforms, Kurland finds the scene bleak.
He discerns no major structural changes reallocating presidential
powers. 49 He overstates his point, however, in asserting that there
has been only a single post-Watergate "reform"-public financing of
presidential campaigns-and that this reform did nothing to remedy
the causes of Watergate.50 Each of these assertions appears to be mis-
taken. First, the financing of both the Watergate break-in and the
later cover-up came from the laundered cash raised in great abundance
by arm-twisting campaign aides who suggested that official favor
would flow from generosity.51 Although public financing of elections
may not be a panacea for political or electoral abuses, Kurland is
simply wrong to ignore the widespread fund-raising abuses that were
exposed during the Watergate investigations. Dependence on a few
large contributions for political success tends to distort a public of-
ficial's view of himself as a "public servant"; thus there is a direct
link between private financing and Watergate abuses.
47. In 1968, President Nixon barely defeated Senator Hubert Humphrey, winning
only 43.4% of the popular vote (Senator Humphrey captured 42.7% and Governor George
Wallace 13.5%). 1978 READER's DIGEST ALMANAC 383. In 1972, however, President Nixon
garnered 60.7% of the popular vote, and his margin of victory over Senator McGovern
was a record 18 million votes. Id.
48. For example, the Harris Survey found in October 1972, shortly before the election,
that 55% of those surveyed gave President Nixon a "negative" rating on his "handling
of corruption in government." 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, NVATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF
A Ciusis 29 (1973).
49. See p. 198.
50. See pp. 183-88.
51. See generally B. WoomWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PREsMENT'S MEN (1974).
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Kurland's pessimism about the extent of post-Watergate reform is
misplaced for other reasons. First, Congress has recently passed the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978.52 That measure provides a
mechanism for court appointment of temporary special prosecutors
to investigate and prosecute executive wrongdoing in certain situa-
tions.5 3 The legislation also establishes procedures for financial dis-
closure by top officers and employees of all three branches of gov-
ernment, deals with post-employment conflicts of interest, creates an
Office of Government Ethics, and sets up an Office of Senate Legal
Counsel.
54
Second, intensified congressional oversight over the intelligence
community has reduced the ability of future administrations to use
the intelligence agencies for domestic political purposes, even if it
has not entirely eliminated that potential abuse.
Third, Kurland neglects to mention the increasing use of a de-
vice that is directly responsive to one of the institutional failings
he identifies: the failure of Congress to check executive exertions
of power. The device is the legislative veto, by which one House
of Congress, or both Houses acting concurrently but without presi-
dential approval, can nullify executive or administrative decisions. In
ignoring the legislative veto, Kurland ignores the principal device
designed to reconcile congressional responsibility with the practical
demands of modern government. The fact that the constitutionality
of the legislative veto is seriously questioned5 makes Kurland's failure
to discuss it all the more startling.
Through the legislative veto, Congress delegates broad authority
and discretion to effectuate legislative programs while attempting to
reserve the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, the particular
projects, rules, or standards that may conflict with congressional
intent. Literally hundreds of federal statutes now contain some type
of legislative veto mechanism by which, short of formal legislation,
Congress or its members can defer or annul action taken by the
executive branch or an independent agency.50 Such statutes are di-
52. Pub. L. No. 95-521, reprinted in 124 CONG. REc. H12,285 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978).
53. For an analysis of the constitutionality of court-appointed special prosecutors, see
Note, The Proposed Court-Appointed Special Prosecutor: In Quest of a Constitutional
Justification, 87 YALE LJ. 1692 (1978).
54. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, reprinted in 124 CONG.
REc. H12,285 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978).
55. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A
Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1373-74 (1977).
56. A 1976 study found that between 1932 and 1975 Congress enacted 126 statutcs
containing 183 separate provisions for congressional review, deferral, approval, or dis-
approval of proposed executive action. See Library of Congress, Legislative Research
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verse; they range from statutes allowing a single committee of one
House to overturn a decision,57 to statutes requiring the concurrence
of both Houses in a resolution of disapproval. 5 Hardly any signif-
icant legislation considered by the Ninety-fifth Congress dealing
with federal programs was not the target of efforts by congressmen
seeking to reassert legislative prerogatives by tacking on a legislative
veto provision. 9
Concern about President Nixon's alleged abuses contributed sub-
stantially to the dramatic evolution of this device. Indeed, 87 of the
183 legislative veto provisions passed since 1932 were enacted during
or immediately following the Nixon Presidency. 0 The more recent
uses of the legislative veto have not yet been sustained by the courts,
Service, Congressional Review, Deferral and Disapproval of Executive Actions: A Summary
and an Inventory of Statutory Authority, reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS & GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 94Tu CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT 80 (Comm. Print 1976) (prepared for Subcomm. on Oversight Procedures of
Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations) [hereinafter cited as LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY
with page citations to Comm. Print].
57. There are 20 such provisions. Id. at 84; see, e.g., National Science Foundation
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-96, § 6, 87 Stat. 316 (1973) (permitting certain com-
mittees to veto any allocation of 10% of NSF funds); Department of Interior Appropria-
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 93-120, 87 Stat. 43 (1973) (requiring approval of certain committees
before changing borders of national forests).
58. See, e.g., Education Amendments of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1976) (allowing both
Houses to disapprove any general standard, rule or regulation promulgated by Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare as "inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its
authority"); Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2441-2443 (1976) (allowing both
Houses to reject President's proposal to provide financial assistance to any country in
Middle East).
59. The proposed Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments, H.R. Res. 3816, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), for example, remained stalled in conference for months because
the House insisted on the right to disapprove FTC trade regulation rules, and the Senate
supported the FTC's objection to this oversight. See 124 CONG. REC. H1573-79 (daily ed.
Feb. 28, 1978).
60. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 56, at 81. As a direct response to Presi-
dent Nixon's military initiatives in Viet Nam and Cambodia, including some of the
"'secret bombings" of Cambodia that later became the subject of a possible article of
impeachment, see H.R. RP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 217-19 (1974), Congress in 1973
enacted 50 U.S.C. §§ 1547-1548 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), superimposing congressional judg-
ment over the President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2. Following President Nixon's resignation, Congress passed a "Watergate re-
form"-which Kurland erroneously terms unrelated to Watergate abuses, see pp. 666-67
supra; p. 187-that largely transferred financing of presidential elections to the United
States Treasury. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
443, 88 Stat. 1263. Included in those campaign finance amendments was a provision for
legislative veto of implementing regulations and opinions of the Federal Elections Com-
mission. The legislative veto also figured prominently in another Watergate reform
statute, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3315-3324 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), by which Congress asserted public ownership-with
just compensation to be paid, if necessary-of all of President Nixon's official papers, in-
cluding the infamous White House Tapes.
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but they show considerable potential for reestablishing Congress as an
equal participant in the functioning of modern government.
Although Kurland is sharply critical of the lack of significant post-
Watergate reform, he offers only a single proposal himself-a proposal,
moreover, that is ill-advised. In drawing out his contention that Con-
gress has failed to address the real problems spawning the Watergate
abuses, Kurland quotes from a brief statement he submitted to a
congressional committee in 1975 on the proposed Watergate Reform
Act of 1975.61 The bill62 would have created a permanent "special
prosecutor"-a proposal Kurland opposed-and would have created
a "Congressional Legal Counsel"-a concept Kurland supported. In
addition to representing congressional interests in court, Kurland
urged that a new Congressional Legal Counsel be given "the in-
vestigatory and prosecutorial function" of handling impeachment
inquiries directed at Executive Branch officials. 63 This recommenda-
tion reflects Kurland's support for the increased use of the impeach-
ment procedure, not only for restraining an incumbent President but
for monitoring "all executive branch officials," including those "who
have already separated themselves or been separated from the service
of the nation. 0 4 Clearly, this proposal represents the height of im-
practicability and reveals on Kurland's part a lack of appreciation for
the realities of constitutional government. Indeed, the principal
reason that impeachment had long ago fallen into disuse is that the
process is too cumbersome to be effective.a It is plainly irrational
61. Pp. 195-96; see SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 'WATERGATE REORGANIZA-
TION AND REFORM ACT OF 1975: PERSPECTIVES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL AND ACADEMIC
COMMUNITIES 103-05 (Comm. Print. 1975).
62. S. 495, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975), 121 CONG. REc. S1821 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1975).
63. P. 196. Under Title VII of the 1978 Ethics Act, the Senate Legal Counsel is gen-
erally limited to representing Senate interests in court. See 124 CONG. REC. H12,301 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1978) (Senate Counsel can defend Senate and institute civil action to enforce
subpoena).
64. P. 196.
65. Since 1789, there have been approximately 60 attempts to have the House impeach
federal officials, but only 13 have actually been impeached: one President (Andrew
Johnson, 1868), one cabinet officer (Secretary of War Belknap, 1876), one senator (1797),
and 10 federal judges (1803-1936). CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 203 (2d
ed. 1976). Only four officials (all judges) have been convicted and removed from office by
the Senate. Id. There have been no impeachments in 42 years. See id. at 208.
Most House impeachments (10 of 13) have involved federal judges. Id. at 203. Prior
to the Nixon impeachment inquiry (and apart from the abortive effort by then-Repre-
sentative Gerald R. Ford to impeach Justice William 0. Douglas in 1970, see 116 CoNG.
REc. 11,912-14 (Apr. 15, 1970)), the last serious impeachment investigation was in 1936.
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, supra, at 208. It involved a district judge and was successful. Id.
On September 7, 1978, the Senate passed a bill that would create a special court to force
the removal or retirement of judges found guilty of misconduct or suffering from dis-
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to expect the full House of Representatives, functioning like a grand
jury, to debate the legal and factual bases for articles of impeachment
against an inferior federal officer, or to expect the full Senate to
assume the role of an impeachment court to try the articles. Al-
though Kurland is correct in stating that there must be a stimulus
to congressional resurgence, it is foolhardy to propose that Congress
should revive the current impeachment procedure as a major pre-
occupation of its time.
IV. A Final Note
Kurland covers considerable ground in his book, but unfortunately
his plow cultivates with more breadth than depth. He is frank enough
to describe this book as a collection of essays, rather than a treatise,6
and "Watergate" merely provides him with a convenient matrix for
diverse reflections. He includes such subjects as the power of con-
gressional inquiry, 7 the grounds for impeachment,68 the "self-in-
flated role of the judiciary,0 9 the extent of the President's power to
abilities. In explaining the need for the new procedure, the sponsor of the bill, Senator
DeConcini, stated:
Historically, Congress has been reluctant to use the drastic measure of impeach-
ment .... One reason for this reluctance is the fact that impeachment is a complex,
slow, and cumbersome process that absorbs an incredible amount of time in both
Houses of Congress .... Because it is not used, impeachment has ceased to be a real
deterrent to misconduct on the bench.
124 CoNe. REC. S14,745-46 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978) (Sen. DeConcini) (discussing S. 1423,




69. E.g., pp. 7-16, 74. Despite the fact that Kurland describes Watergate as "an execu-
tive branch disaster," p. 169, he seizes every opportunity to criticize the courts. Un-
fortunately, his comments on the courts, like much of his book, tend to be highly
polemical rather than carefully reasoned. For example, Kurland suggests that the Supreme
Court may have acted too hastily in granting the Special Prosecutor's petition for
certiorari before judgment by the court of appeals in the Nixon Tapes Case, and in
deciding it, amidst the impeachment debate, under the "unfortunately appropriate" title
United States v. Nixon. P. 64; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Neglected,
however, is any reference to the dynamics of this constitutional litigation, a topic on which
Kurland surely could have speculated even in the absence of hard information. The fact
is that the Special Prosecutor's Office projected that favorable resolution of the constitu-
tional claims as well as eventual compliance with the Court's mandate would be more
likely if the case reached the Court in the context of public attention to the impeach-
ment proceedings. The decision to apply for certiorari before judgment reflected that
sense of timing. It also allowed the Special Prosecutor's Office to choose the caption of
the case-United States v. Nixon-thus casting the constitutional contest in a framework
that vividly simplified the issues. Finally, it provided implicit momentum on one of the
key constitutional issues before the Court: the Special Prosecutor's authority to represent
the "United States" as a sovereign government in pursuing evidence that "happened" to
be in the hands of Richard Nixon the President. This approach was, incidentally, later
accepted by the Court. See id. at 697.
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remove appointees,70 the indictability of a sitting President,7' and the
nature of the modern Presidency.72 Because the format is essentially
that of the essay, Kurland claims the right to be tentative and pro-
vocative,7 3 and that is what this book is. A reader searching for Kur-
land's traditional depth and firmness will not find it.
Nevertheless, Kurland's book is a worthwhile excursion that identi-
fies dozens of intriguing constitutional questions littering the Water-
gate landscape. Many of these issues remain unanswered or insuffi-
ciently explored, and perhaps the chief value of this work is in re-
minding us that, although Richard Nixon and his aides may be gone,




73. See p. ix.
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